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RECENT DECISIONS
portion of the consideration as the value of the land which he lost
bears to the whole consideration.
But in Connecticut and Massachusetts, Cecconi v. Rodden, 147
Mass. 164, 16 N. E. 749 (1888); Butler v. Barnes, 61 Conn. 399,
24 Atl. 328 (1892), the plaintiff is permitted to recover the value of
the improvements he put on the land; but it is submitted that this
rule is illogical for, at the time of the conveyance of the land the
records were open to both parties and a search thereof would have
disclosed the true owner and in such case, of two innocent persons,
neither should be made to suffer for the misfortune of the other.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-POLICE POWERS-ZONING REGULATIONS.
-The village of Euclid, a suburb of Cleveland, Ohio, passed the
zoning laws in question which provided for use, height and area dis-
tricts. Plaintiff attacks the constitutionality of the measure on the
ground that it is in derogation of the 14th amendment of the United
States Constitution in that the plaintiff is deprived of liberty and prop-
erty without due process of law and is denied the equal protection of
the law. Held, in the lower court judgment was rendered for the plain-
tiff, reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court, with three justices dis-
senting, on the ground that zoning regulations are within the police
powers of the state and as such are valid when not arbitrary or
unreasonable. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.. 47 Sup. Ct.
Rep. (U. S.) 114 (1926).
Zoning regulations are an outgrowth of modern civilization, called
forth by the complexities of present day life. They may be divided
into two classes, namely, those regulatory in their nature and those
passed for aesthetic purposes. Cochran v. Preston, 180 Md. 220,
70 At. 113 (1908) ; 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) .1163; Welch v. Swasey,
193 Mass. 364, 79 N. E. 745, 214 U. S. 91 (1908). In the first class
are included the provisions restricting the height, use and location
of commercial and dwelling houses, in the second, regulations in refer-
ence to bill-boards, sky-signs, etc.
These ordinances, which twenty-five years ago, would have been
rejected as unconstitutional as an arbitrary abuse of power, are now
being generally sustained in most jurisdictions. In re Opinion of the
Justices, 235 Mass. 597, 127 N. E. 525 (1920): State v. City of New
Orleans, et al., 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440 (1923); Lincoln Trust Co. v.
Williams Bldg. Corp., 229 N. Y. 313, 128 N. E. 209 (1920); City of
Aurora v. Burns, et al., 319 Ill. 84, 149 N. E. 784 (1925); State v.
Houghton, 164 Minn. 146, 204 N. XV. 569 (1925); Miller v. Board
of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 Pac. 381 (1925); under the so-
called "police powers" of the state. For what once was a lonely
cow-path now is a broad highway, teeming with motor vehicles and
other conveyances, all inherently dangerous instruments. What once
was a small rural community now is a large city, pulsating with life
and all its problems, requiring more and better fire, police and other
protection. This rule is, therefore, not inconsistent with the former
one, for, while it is true that the meaning of the constitution cannot
be stretched, we must impart a certain sense of elasticity to its
application, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 47 U. S. Sup.
Ct. 114 (1926). If the rule were otherwise, the original purpose
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and spirit of the constitution would be defeated by its rigid con-
struction. But the line which separates those regulations that are
legal from those that are illegal, the beneficial from the detri-
mental, is a shadowy one and vaires with conditions and circum-
stances. In settling doubts, we may have recourse to the maxim
"Sic utere tuo ut laienum non laedas," and other common law
principles underlying the law of nuisances.
There has 'been no great disparity in the rulings sustaining the
validity of measures regulating the height, use, and location of
buildings and thus, comprehensive zoning plans have been upheld
in most states. In re opinion of Justices, 235 Mass. 597, '127 N. E.
525 (1920); State v. City of New Orleans, et at., 154 La. 271, 97
So. 440 (1923); Wulfson v. Burden, 241 N. Y. 228, 150 N. E. 120
(1925); City of Aurora v. Burns, et at., 319 Ill. 84, 149 N. E. 784
(1925); State v. Harper, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N. W. 451 (1923); Ware
v. City of Wichita, 113 Kan. 153, 214 Pac. 99 (1923); with the ex-
ception of New Jersey and Texas. Spann v. City of Dallas,
et al., 111 Tex. 350, 235 S. W. 513, 19 A.L.R. 1387 (1921). See
also City of Dallas v. Mitchell, 245 S. W. 944 (1922); Ignacumas
v. Rielly, 98 N. J. Law 712, 121 Atl. 783 (1923); where the court
said: (In Span v. City of Dallas) "The police power is founded in
public necessity, and only public necessity can justify its existence."
But in the case of Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Building Corp.,
229 N. Y. 313, 128 N. E. 209 (1920) the New York Court of Appeals
expressly held that public necessity required the existence of zoning
regulations -and upheld an ordinance providing for a strictly resi-
dential district. This case was followed by the case of Matter of
Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N. Y. 228, 150 N. E. 120 (1925), in which
the court said: "The power (police) is not limited to regulations
designed to promote public health, public morals or public safety, or
to the suppression of what is offensive, disorderly or unsanitary,
but extends to so dealing with conditions which exist as to bring out
of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public con-
venience or general prosperity." Thus it would appear that zoning
laws relating to height, use and location of buildings are accepted
by the great weight of authority in this 'country. (See preceding
citations.)
The great difficulty now being encountered is in the support of
the "aesthetic" zoning ordinances. Although few courts recognize
the validity of such ordinances, Piper, et a1., v. Ekern, 180 Wis. 586,
194 N. W. 159 (1923); Ryan v. City of Chester, et al., 212 Pa. 259,
61 Atl. 284 (1905); Billposting Sign Co. v. Atlantic City, 71 N. J.
Law 72, 58 AtI. 342 (1904); City of Passaic v. Paterson Billposting
Co., 72 N. J. Law 285, 62 Atl. 267 (1905); they are upheld by some,
Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass., 364, 79 N. E. 745 affirmed 214 U. S. 91,
29 Supreme Court 67 (1908). Thus, in the Massachusetts case of
Welsh v. Swasey, supra; it was held that if the primary pur-
pose was to promote public safety and health, the fact that there were
aesthetic considerations would not invalidate the regulation if those
considerations were secondary. But in the Maryland case ot
Cochran v. Preston, 108 Md. 220, 70 Atl. 113, 23 L.R.A. N.S. 1163,
(1908), the court went a step further and it held that even though
the primary purpose of an act be aesthetic, it may be upheld if
RECENT DECISIONS
there can be found some secondary purpose to promote public health
and safety.
However, it was held in New York, People v. Murphy, 195 N. Y.
126 affirming 129 A. D. 260 (1909), that an ordinance which limited
the height of a sky sign to nine feet was unconstitutional, but the
same court, in a later case, People v. Ludwig, 172 A. D. 71 affirmed
218 N. Y. 540, 113 N. E. 532 (1916), held that an ordinance re-
stricting the height of a sky sign to thirty-one feet in the case of solid
signs and seventy-five feet in the case of open signs was valid. This
was followed by the case of People v. Wolf, 216 N. Y. S. 741, 127
Misc. 382 (1926), which held unconstitutional a village ordinance pro-
hibiting the erection of any advertising signs except those used for
the purpose of advertising real estate, on the ground that it was not
calculated to remedy an existing evil; that it does not tend to pro-
mote public health, public safety, public morals or general welfare;
and that it is discriminatory, in that it permits one kind of advertis-
ing and prohibits all other kinds. The case of People v. Wolf, supra,
although it has not yet gone up on appeal seems to be the last word
of the New York Courts. It would, therefore, seem that there is a
serious conflict of authority as to those ordinances aesthetic in their
nature. It is submitted that the rule followed by Massachusetts,
Welch v. Swasey, supra, and Maryland; Cochran v. Preston, et al.,
supra, is the sounder one for, in time to come, courts will be compelled
to take judicial notice of the fact that a beautiful city, whose buildings
present a picture of symmetry in art and design, is as much a property
right of the city and its inhabitants as any other property right and as
such should be protected. These views were voiced by Crownhart, J.,
in a dissenting opinion in the Wisconsin case of Piper, et al., v. Ekern,
supra, in which he said: "I do not believe that the constitutionality of
the statute need rest upon the narrow ground of safety and health,
though I think them ample to sustain the present statute as an exercise
of the police power. If 'public welfare' has not done so already, it is
high time it took on a meaning for the courts which it has already done
for the rest of the world ......
INSURANCE-KNOWLEDGE OF AGENT IMPUTABLE TO PRINCIPAL.-The
defendant insurance company employed one Bowler as a soliciting
agent. Bowler took the written application of Otto Rose for insur-
ance on a threshing machine. The policy was issued upon the applica-
tion which contained a clause voiding the policy should the subject
of the insurance be or become incumbered by chattel mortgage. The
plaintiff at the time of the destruction of the machine had a chattel
mortgage covering it though it was in the possession of Rose. After
the destruction Rose assigned his entire interest in the policy to the
plaintiff. When the application was filled by Rose he informed Bowler
of the mortgage. Bowler, after receiving this information, proceeded
to fill out application and caused policy to be issued on same. Policy
issued had no mortgage clause, or indorsement, or rider attached re-
ferring to the incumbrance. In an action by the plaintiff on the
policy the defense is voiding of same because of the incumbrance.
Held, in reversing the decision of the lower court, which nonsuited
the plaintiff, that when an agent of an insurance company procures
the issuance of a policy after being informed of an incumbrance
